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RISKY BUSINESS: A NEW(ISH) APPROACH TO CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Anish Patel*
“[T]hat’s not stupidity, that’s fraud.”
“Tell me the difference between stupid and illegal and I’ll have my
wife’s brother arrested.”
-The Big Short1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Big Short tells the story of an investor’s bet against the
American housing market.2 Simply put, the bet (the “Abacus” deal)
involved shorting a large number of financial instruments known as
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”).3 The investment bank working on
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1 THE BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015).
2 See id.; Phillip Whalen & Kara Tan Bhala, Goldman Sachs and The ABACUS Deal,
SEVEN PILLARS INST. (Apr. 25 2011), https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/goldman-sachscase.
3 Shorting a security entails “borrowing” the security from a current holder and
selling it immediately, hoping that the price will drop, upon which the short seller can
buy the security back and cover the prior loan of the security. MBS refers to financial
instruments known as derivatives. Derivatives are investment contracts that “derive”
their value from another underlying asset, such as stock, or in the case of MBS, a series
of mortgages. Derivatives based on the mortgage of family homes are known as
Residential MBS or RMBS. The underlying mortgages generate interest income and are
then packaged together at different risk levels for the different preferences of investors,
collectively organized as a Collateralized Debt Obligation, or CDO. A CDO is one type of
MBS instrument; the Abacus deal involved a CDO. The problem behind the Abacus deal
was that the mortgages that made up the CDO were “subprime” residential mortgages,
which were risky loans given out to borrowers who characteristically are borrowers
with poor financial metrics, such as high debt-to-income ratios, limited savings, low
credit scores, and who would typically not qualify for financing. See id.
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the deal found investors to supply the securities for the bet but failed to
disclose the bet’s nature to them.4 Once the housing market failed, the
bet paid off to the tune of one billion dollars.5 The investors who
provided the risky securities for the short lost about as much.6
Many trends, factors, and failures set the stage for the Great
Recession.7 The growing demand for deals like Abacus was a part of this
prelude. But these complex transactions were new to everyone: to the
government, to the homeowners who were unknowingly enmeshed in
them, and to the individuals and firms initiating the transactions.8
Millions of people and businesses lost trillions of dollars in wealth.9 The
Great Recession was one of the greatest market and regulatory failures
of our time, and it “was the result of human action and inaction.”10 In
concluding that the “crisis was avoidable,” the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (“FCIC”) observed that “captains of finance and the public
stewards of our financial system ignored warnings and failed to
question, understand, and manage evolving risks” in the financial
system.11

4

See id.
Whalen & Bhala, supra note 2.
6 Id.
7 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT XVII–XX, 27–28 (2011) [hereinafter
FCIC REPORT]. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) observed that massive
changes in mortgage lending and deregulation all helped set the stage for the Great
Recession. Id. Deregulation allowed larger banks to engage in increasingly riskier
activity that put large institutions, such as AIG and Lehman Brothers, at risk, increasing
the risk that the economy would fail if enough large institutions failed. See id. The
lending industry saw a paradigm change. Banks that usually originated loans and held
them to maturity shifted to packaging the loans into securities with the collaboration of
Wall Street to then take advantage of a new massive new market for these securities.
See id.
8 See id. at XVI–XVII (“The financial system we examined bears little resemblance
to that of our parents’ generation. The changes in the past three decades alone have been
remarkable. . . . Technology has transformed the efficiency, speed, and complexity of
financial instruments and transactions.”).
9 See id. at XV (observing in 2010–2011 that “[a]s this report goes to print, there are
more than 26 million Americans who are out of work, cannot find full-time work, or have
given up looking for work. About four million families have lost their homes to
foreclosure and another four and a half million have slipped into the foreclosure process
or are seriously behind on their mortgage payments. Nearly $11 trillion in household
wealth has vanished, with retirement accounts and life savings swept away.”).
10 Id. at XVII.
11 Id.
5
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Given such a stark conclusion, perhaps it is easy to understand
public frustration with the government and “Wall Street,” especially
after government bailouts paid using taxpayer dollars.12 One might ask,
where are the criminal charges for this conduct—why are none of these
individuals in jail for the harms they inflicted because of their ignorance
and lack of judgment?13 In many states, driving recklessly can result in
imprisonment,14 but it seems that those who recklessly drove the
American economy to ruin have escaped the reach of criminal law. Such
simple questions have no simple answers. Consider the quote above
from Jared Vennet, a fictitious character based on the real-life Deutsche
Bank executive Greg Lippmann, who bet against the housing markets.15
The line between what is stupid, or perhaps negligent in legal terms, and
what is criminal can be a hard one to draw. That line may be paper-thin
in some circumstances, but it is the line at which we invite the
government’s most intrusive form of regulation into our lives, criminal
sanction and incarceration.
This line-drawing challenge is not new—it is a settled principle
that in criminal law the same act can be innocent or criminal based on
the actor’s state of mind at the time.16 Most criminal statutes will specify
what level of intent the offender must exhibit to find the offender guilty
12 Glenn Kessler, Did Wall Street Get a ‘Trillion-dollar Bailout’ During the Financial
Crisis?, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/03/18/did-wall-street-get-trillion-dollar-bailout-during-financial-crisis.
13 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at XVI (“There is much anger about what has
transpired, and justifiably so. Many people who abided by all the rules now find
themselves out of work and uncertain about their future prospects. The collateral
damage of this crisis has been real people and real communities. The impacts of this
crisis are likely to be felt for a generation.”); Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker
Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jailfinancial-crisis.html (observing that over one thousand executives were prosecuted
after the savings-and-loan scandal of the 1980s, compared to one executive prosecuted
after the financial crisis of 2008). While no one has put the specific question of whether
or not bankers should go to jail for their conduct leading to 2008 to the polls, American
confidence in banks has never returned to its pre-Great Recession levels, with only thirty
percent of Americans reporting they had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in
banks. See Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/
1597/Confidence-Institutions.aspx.
14 See, e.g., N.J.S.A. § 39:4-96 (2013); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103 (2011).
15 Annabel Murphy, Meet the Men The Big Short’s Jared Vennett and Mark Baum Are
Based On, SUN (Dec. 15, 2018, 5:53 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/7988107/
the-big-short-jared-vennett-mark-baum.
16 See JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 157–59
(Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015). This is the principle of “actus non facit reum
nisi mens sit rea,” or “[a]n act does not make [the actor] guilty, unless the mind be guilty.”
Id. at 157 (quoting United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 490 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (4th ed. 1968))).
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and impose punishment, representing the legislature’s choice for what
state of mind is sufficient for the moral condemnation that criminal law
brings upon a person.17 It is well-accepted that this individual
accountability is an important part of regulating legal entities such as
corporations and banks as those entities only act through individuals.18
Accounting for this difficult-to-draw line, one can offer two
theories to explain the lack of individual prosecutions after 2008. One
theory is that falling budgets, a lack of experience in conducting complex
fraud investigations, the prospect of the government’s own
involvement, and the ease with which a prosecutor can settle with an
institution for a large fine compared to the difficulty of a full
investigation and trial would lead any reasonable prosecutor to find that
the costs do not justify the risk-adjusted benefits of charging and
prosecuting the culpable individuals.19 The other theory is much
simpler. Under the governing laws, it is possible that the actions taken
by the various individuals and entities leading up to 2008 were simply

17 See id. at 4, 158. The mens rea requirement is one way to distinguish criminal
law’s punitive effect from civil law’s pricing effect, distinguishing merely negligent or
even reckless actors who produce harm through their failures to live up to objective
standards from those with nefarious purposes who make conscious decisions resulting
in harm. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193–95 (1991)
(explaining the importance of the distinctions and relative positions of criminal and tort
law).
18 See, e.g., Developments in the Law – Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1243–45 (1979)
[hereinafter Developments in the Law] (explaining the importance of individual
sanctions in corporate criminal law); John C. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick:
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386,
387 (1981) (“[L]aw enforcement officials cannot afford to ignore either the individual
or the firm in choosing their targets . . . .”); David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and
Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L.
REV. 1295, 1299 (2013) (“The most effective way to combat corporate crime, however,
is to prosecute the individuals who committed the offenses and the companies involved.
The law on corporate liability is well established in the United States, making clear that
corporations are criminally responsible for the criminal acts of their employees
committed within the scope of their employment.”).
19 See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/
01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions (explaining both theories and
the evidence supporting each); FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 163 (explaining how the
FBI and DOJ officials “believed that other issues were more pressing” and “didn’t get
what [they] had requested during the budget process” to combat rising mortgage fraud
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate
Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533, 535–37 (2015)
(arguing that prosecutors have an easier time prosecuting entities compared to
prosecuting individual actors).
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not crimes.20 If there is substantial difficulty in proving the mens rea of
the criminal statute, it begs the question of whether that particular mens
rea was present at all. The real answer perhaps lies somewhere
between these two theories, but they both pose a problem to future
criminal prosecutions of individual actors.
Recognizing that individual criminal accountability is an important
part of the regulatory system in the context of corporate institutions,
this Comment will argue that current approaches to individual criminal
liability in the corporate setting are ineffective because they are not
adapted for modern corporate settings. Namely, the unfitness lies in
two intertwined areas: (1) that the mens rea standards in criminal
statutes traditionally used in this context no longer track the behavior
the statutes aim to regulate and (2) that the law fails to target, and
subsequently incentivize or disincentivize, the individuals responsible
for setting organizational policies and effecting change. This unfitness
helps explain the lack of individual prosecutions of the institutional
leaders that contributed to the financial crisis and exposes a weakness
in the regulatory system, hindering its goals of protecting the public and
ensuring ethical behavior.21 More concerning, if left unaddressed, this
unfitness will render the criminal sanction—one of the most effective
tools of regulation—nearly useless in fighting corporate crime. At least
to the casual observer who acknowledges that crime deserves
punishment, this double standard22 is troubling.
This Comment proposes a simple solution—make it easier to
prosecute corporate officers and managers who engage in or allow
criminal conduct in their institutions. In doing so, however, one must
acknowledge that the criminal sanction is strong medicine, and any
criminal statute must be carefully articulated to prevent overdeterrence
and penalizing those who are not sufficiently culpable. This Comment
argues that the combination of two doctrines in criminal law,
20 See Duke Law Professor Sam Buell on Business Crime and Punishment in America’s
Corporate Age, CORP. CRIME REP., (Aug. 31, 2016) [hereinafter Buell Interview],
https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/duke-law-professor-sam-buellon-business-crime-and-punishment-in-americas-corporate-age.
21 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at XVIII, XXII (concluding that the “widespread
failures in financial regulation and supervision, . . . dramatic failures of corporate
governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions,
. . . were [] key cause[s] of this crisis and that there was “a systemic breakdown in
accountability and ethics”).
22 See Paul Krugman, Springtime for Bankers, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/opinion/02krugman.html (noting a similar
“double standard” between the federal government’s concerted efforts to save and prop
up the financial sector post-2008 and its near absence of efforts to help the
mortgage-debt-laden victims of the crisis).
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Responsible Corporate Officer (“RCO”) liability23 and criminal
recklessness,24 can strike a balance between the need to deter
misconduct and the need to punish only those who are sufficiently
culpable. When combined, the result is a comprehensive tool to combat
corporate misconduct that targets those who have the power to change
corporate policy and employs a mens rea that tracks the way those
individuals do business. It imposes an affirmative duty upon corporate
officers to prevent criminal violations and backs the duty up with
criminal sanction.
This approach revamps a theoretically similar proposal in a 1979
article in the Harvard Law Review, which was a response to
circumstances in corporate behavior that also played a role in the 2008
financial crisis.25 This Comment notes an analogous proposal in a Senate
bill, the Corporate Executive Accountability Act (“CEAA”),26 introduced
by Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts. But this
Comment will argue that Warren’s proposal goes too far and would
upset the important balance between seeking deterrence and retaining
sufficient moral culpability. Instead, this Comment proposes a
recklessness standard. It should also be noted that the proposed
solution is not a panacea, but it will be a helpful step toward a more
effective regulatory system.

23 RCO liability allows prosecutors to impose liability on a corporate officer or
employee in certain industries who stands in “responsible relation” to the illegal
conduct, even if the officer took no part in the conduct at all, imposing strict liability. See
infra Part III. The FCIC’s interviewed several executives who foresaw the financial
collapse and attempted to alert their superiors to no avail. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra
note 7, at 3−4. This Comment will argue that the RCO doctrine’s expansive reach allows
regulatory to target those superiors directly. See infra Part III (explaining the RCO
doctrine).
24 Criminal recklessness is a level of mens rea that requires finding the actor
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to impose punishment. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (defining criminal recklessness). The FCIC’s concluded that
“[t]oo many of these institutions acted recklessly [in] taking on too much risk . . . .” FCIC
REPORT, supra note 7, at XVIII. This Comment argues that because risk-taking is the
financial community’s norm, recklessness’s doctrinal focus on risk-taking fits the norm.
See infra Part IV (explaining criminal recklessness).
25 Developments in the Law, supra note 18
26 S. 1010, 116th Cong. (2019). Senator Warren alludes to RCO liability in her
introduction of the bill. See Press Release, Off. of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Senator
Warren Unveils Bill to Expand Criminal Liability to Negligent Executives of Giant
Corporations (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/senator-warren-unveils-bill-to-expand-criminal-liability-to-negligentexecutives-of-giant-corporations.

PATEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/15/2021 11:56 AM

COMMENT

907

If the cinematic reference in the title was not enough, the structure
of this Comment follows the English fairy tale of Goldilocks and the
Three Bears.27 In Part II, this Comment will discuss the background of
corporate criminal liability. This includes a discussion of the regulatory
function of criminal law in this context and modern corporate behavior.
Part II will then discuss the ineffectiveness of present remedies geared
toward individual accountability, or porridge that is “too cold.” Part III
will explore the RCO doctrine as a potential solution for corporate
misconduct, a solution that has been called for by other commentators,
but will conclude that doctrine alone goes too far, presenting problems
of overdeterrence and punishing those not sufficiently culpable—
porridge that is “too hot.” Part IV will then explain how the CEAA, which
incorporates RCO, is a step in the right direction but still goes too far in
using a negligence standard, or a porridge that is still too hot. Part IV
will then analyze the costs and benefits of combining RCO with criminal
recklessness, concluding that this combination is “just right.”
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A BRIEF PRIMER ON A LENGTHY PROBLEM
This Part will serve to set the stage for the Comment’s proposed
solutions. Section A applies the traditional justifications applied in
criminal law to the corporate environment. It then explains how
individual accountability best serves these interests. Section B
describes how modern corporate behavior falls outside the bounds of
what current criminal statutes capture, using examples from the
financial crisis. Section C considers some of the reforms and solutions
already available, explaining how they are part of a trend geared toward
effectively holding individuals accountable but fall short of being
effective changes. This Part concludes by identifying two challenges
that face regulatory focus on individual accountability: (1) targeting
senior decision makers, who are the appropriate target of the corporate
criminal law given their broad authority to shape corporate policy, and
(2) targeting them in a way that is sufficiently justifiable to impose
criminal sanction. The rest of this Comment addresses these challenges.

27 Robert Southey, Goldilocks and the Three Bears, DOCTOR (1837). No bears or
children were harmed in the writing of this Comment.
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A. The Weed That No One Planted
Firms are not natural persons.28 They are legal persons in some
contexts, with rights, privileges, and duties similar or even identical to
those enjoyed and held by natural persons.29 It is settled that a
corporate entity may be convicted of a crime.30 Indeed, the concept of
white-collar crime generally encompasses actions taken by corporate
agents to increase revenue or reduce compliance costs for the
corporation’s gain.31 But the corporate criminal law’s development has
been tortuous, adapting concepts from different areas of the law to
address its unique problems.32 On the regulatory side, the criminal
sanction is but one action of many the State may take.33 But the criminal
sanction is a unique response because it involves moral condemnation
and physical control (in the form of incarceration), representing a
societal decision that the conduct at issue is worthy of punishment
beyond the civil law’s focus on making the victims whole.34 Yet a
corporation has “no soul to damn[,] no body to kick.”35 The State cannot
28 See JEFFERY D. BAUMAN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW AND POLICY 52–53 (Jesse H
Choper et al. eds., 9th ed. 2017) (explaining that corporations and other like business
entities have “legal personhood”).
29 See id.
30 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909).
31 Richard S. Gruner, Corporate Criminal Liability and Prevention § 1.02 (2019); see
also Stuart P. Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory, 8 BUFF.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (explaining the various categories of white-collar crime).
32 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability under the Model Penal
Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 593, 593 (1988) (“Corporate criminal liability is a paradox.”);
Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporations - A Study of the Model Penal Code
Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 21 (1957) (“[Corporate
criminal liability] is a hybrid of vicarious liability, absolute liability, an inkling of mens
rea, . . . a few genes from tort law and a few from the law of business associations. . . .
Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”).
33 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 38–40 (1992). Ayres and Braithwaite introduce the idea of the
enforcement pyramid paradigm, which posits that cooperative regulation sits at the
bottom of a pyramid, and all other sanctions, including criminal liability, rise from there
in increasing severity. Id. An effective enforcement pyramid requires remedies at
different levels of severity for an effective and adaptable regulatory system. Id.; see also
Buell Interview, supra note 20 (advocating for the enforcement pyramid paradigm for
corporate regulation). This Comment’s position is that individual criminal liability is at
the very top of the pyramid as applied to corporate misconduct. That said, any
improvements to the application of individual criminal liability have a trickle-down
effect on all other sanctions by increasing their desirability to both regulators and the
regulated entities.
DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra, note 16, at 1–3 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 402–06 (1958)).
35 Coffee, Jr., supra note 18, at 386 (quoting M. KING, POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 1
(1977)). In fact, some of the difficulty in adapting criminal law to a corporate entity
stems from a lack of consensus on the theory animating corporate entities themselves.
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employ its coercive power to punish a corporation in the way it can
incarcerate an individual wrongdoer.36
Instead, an organization is a collection of individuals. Together, the
individuals are responsible for the organization’s actions, enjoy the
organization’s benefits, and suffer when the organization suffers.37
Consequently, they must account for laws and regulations when acting
for the organization. But when an individual acting for the corporation
breaks the law, the State faces a choice in how to distribute its resources
between prosecuting individual corporate agents and prosecuting the
entity.38
This choice presents a problem. As it cannot incarcerate an
organization, the State can only go so far in punishing it.39 If the chosen
sanction is monetary, the sanction needs to be severe enough to deter
further misconduct.40 Anything less would be a mere “license fee” for
criminal conduct.41 But go too far and you force the entity into
bankruptcy, jeopardizing the jobs and capital of potentially innocent
parties. Even assuming that the State can find that “sweet spot” with a
sanction, responsibility is not the only thing that is diffuse; blame and
See generally Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation,
21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1994) (offering three different “theories of the
corporation”). Adopting one theory of the corporation would comport with some
criminal law justifications, whereas adopting another would comport with other
justifications.
36 Compare Coffee, Jr., supra note 18 at 390 (“[F]or the corporation, which has no
body to incarcerate, [a] wealth boundary seems an absolute limit on the reach of
deterrent threats directed at it.”) with Developments in the Law, supra note 18,
at 1245–46 (“[E]ven if an individual defendant does not personally pay the fine or his
legal fees, he still suffers the stigma of a criminal conviction with the ensuing damage to
his reputation in the community and prospects within the corporation.”).
37 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1242.
38 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 33, at 19–20 (discussing different approaches
regulators can take).
39 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 18 at 389–90.
40 See id. Consider that if a corporation has the ability to generate ten million dollars
at any given time to pay off a criminal sanction and no more, then a guilty plea of eleven
million dollars will look logically similar to a fine of one hundred million dollars
following a full criminal proceeding. See id. at 390. Both would bankrupt the
corporation, meaning the incentives are the same, regardless of the size of the penalty.
Id. For the sake of simplicity, this simple explanation ignores the complex decisions
involving legal representation and reputation that a corporation might consider. This
analysis views the corporation as a rational economic actor, or one that will calculate
the costs and benefits of any particular decision, such as pleading guilty and paying a
fine versus taking its case to trial, and choose whatever decision is best for its bottom
line, irrespective of any collateral consequences. See id. at 389–90.
41 United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 409 (1962) (“No intent to exculpate a
corporate officer who violates the law is to be imputed to Congress without clear
compulsion; else the fines established by the Sherman Act to deter crime become mere
license fees for illegitimate corporate business operations.”).
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damage can be spread just as easily in a corporate entity.42 In effect, all
of the constituents of a corporate organization suffer when the
organization suffers, not just the responsible parties.43
On the other hand, the effectiveness of punishing an individual
acting for an organization depends to some degree on that particular
individual’s identity. Corporate organizations tend to be hierarchical,
concentrating power toward the top of the ladder.44 While the actor
responsible for the criminal or harmful act might be easy to identify, it
may be much more difficult, or even impossible, to know whether he or
she was acting under the direction of someone else.45 And while the
sanctioned actor may be deterred from future wrongdoing, the higherup is untouched and can continue to direct the organization to engage
in unethical or criminal behavior, perhaps even in a more covert
manner.46
This disparity both undermines the deterrence function of criminal
law by failing to target the real party in power and distorts the moral
condemnation function by failing to punish a culpable party.47 A large
corporation will characteristically have many levels of separation
between its senior decision makers and its line employees.48 Someone
will be punished, to be sure. But little good comes of it. Individual
42 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1255 (explaining that “the
existence of several tiers of middle-level supervisors” makes corporate prosecution
even more difficult”).
43 See Coffee Jr., supra note 18, at 386–87 & n.4 (“[C]orporate punishment seems
perversely insoluble: moderate fines do not deter, while severe penalties flow through
the corporate shell and fall on the relatively blameless.”).
44 See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 141 (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, § 8.01(b) (“[A]ll corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors, and the business and
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the
oversight, of the board of directors.”).
45 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1254–55 (“[C]orporations can
more easily evade conviction since the top officials whose conduct would subject the
corporation to liability are often too far removed from daily operations to be charged . . .
[and] the existence of several tiers of middle-level supervisors makes it more difficult
for the prosecutor to prove that a command or authorization originated with an upper
echelon policymaking official.”).
46 See id. at 1254. Consider the analogy to the Lernaean Hydra, a mythical creature
from Greek literature, which grows two heads whenever Hercules cuts one off.
APOLLODORUS, BIBLIOTHECA, Book 2, Ch. 5, § 2, reprinted at http://data.perseus.org/
citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0548.tlg001.perseus-eng1:2.5.2.
As with the Hydra,
removing one bad actor could simply give rise to another, who may continue the
behavior. See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1266.
47 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1261 (describing the need to
prosecute “indirect actors” who command organizations).
48 Id. at 1254.

PATEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/15/2021 11:56 AM

COMMENT

911

criminal accountability is an important aspect of the regulatory system,
but it must be imposed properly and addressed to the appropriate
parties to have meaningful effects.
B. Organizational Behavior During the Financial Collapse
Even when targeting the proper individuals, the State faces more
challenges. This Section builds upon the last, observing the corporate
mechanism and how it diffuses responsibility, citing examples from the
leadup to the Great Recession to demonstrate.
For prosecutors, the main weapons to respond to most corporate
misconduct are the fraud statutes.49 These criminal statutes contain
difficult elements to prove when applied to upper-level executives.50
These statutes require “that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally
devised or participated in a scheme to defraud another out of money
[and] that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud.”51 Indeed, “an
executive’s claim that he believed in good faith that he was following the
rules presents a severe, even disabling, obstacle to prosecution” because
of the high level of criminal intent the statutes require.52
Presumably, few organizations actively seek out and employ
managers who encourage criminal acts or harbor immoral purposes.
More likely is that corporate managers are too insulated from criminal
acts or unknowingly encourage those acts.53 Commentators and social
scientists alike have long recognized the group dynamics of the “risky
shift” and the tendency for corporate managers to be risk-takers rather
than risk-averse individuals.54 The decision-making framework that
some managers apply is to consider the decision “purely a business
decision rather than an ethical one.”55 This purely business or profit49 Don Mayer et al., Crime and Punishment (or the Lack Thereof) for Financial Fraud
in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses,
51 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 523 (2014) (“Typically, prosecutors rely on two main approaches to
combatting fraud in the financial sector: mail and wire fraud or securities fraud.”) (citing
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1348 (2012)).
50 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (equating specific intent crimes to the mens rea
standard of purpose, the highest intent standard).
51 United States v. Profit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (laying out elements
of wire fraud).
52 See SAMUEL BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S
CORPORATE AGE 15–16 (2016) (citations omitted).
53 See Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, HARV. BUS. REV. 59
(Apr. 2011) (“Much more often, we believe, employees bend or break ethics rules
because those in charge are blind to unethical behavior and may even unknowingly
encourage it.”); supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (observing the levels of
separation between employees and organizational decision makers).
54 Coffee Jr., supra note 18, at 395 (explaining the “risky shift” phenomenon).
55 See Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, supra note 53, at 59.
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maximizing framework that incentivizes employees may be the
problem. For example, consider that setting sales goals may incentivize
employees to be more productive in their efforts, while still behaving
ethically. Yet it might also incentivize them to falsify sales to reach their
goals.56 No observer would fault the organization or its managers for
setting productivity goals, but no observer would consider falsified sales
a good consequence of setting goals.
Similarly, commentators perceive a paradigm shift in capitalism, a
recent transition away from traditional economic models of behavior
which rest on the assumption that competition between groups
incentivizes them to behave ethically.57 This old model gives way to
“managerial capitalism” and a subsequent pronounced decline in ethical
values.58 The FCIC similarly found a decline in ethical values that
contributed to the financial collapse.59 If left unchecked, this problem
may pervade throughout an organization and subsequently throughout
an industry.60 With only piecemeal fixes, there is little stopping another
catastrophe in the name of profit.61
56 See id. at 60 (discussing the example in which Sears Roebuck management set
sales goals for mechanics to find that the employees routinely made up invoices,
repaired items that were not truly broken, and stretched out labor hours).
57 See Neil Fligstein & Alexander Roehrkasse, The Causes of Fraud in Financial Crises:
Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities Industry, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 617, 635 (2016)
(concluding evidence of the financial crisis “provides a critique of conventional wisdom
about the relationship between market structure, regulation, and economic behavior”
and limitations of previously accepted theories); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 487, 493 n.16
(2003) (collecting sources that demonstrate that management’s prioritization of and
philosophy on business ethics play a significant role in the level of corporate
misconduct).
58 Mayer et al., supra note 49, at 530–31 (citing JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL
OF CAPITALISM 7, 220 (2005)).
59 See FCIC R EPORT, supra note 7, at XXII (concluding “there was a systemic
breakdown in accountability and ethics”).
60 See MICHAEL SANTORO & RONALD J. STRAUSS, WALL STREET VALUES: BUSINESS ETHICS AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, 17 (2012) (discussing the proliferation of corporate
“counterparties” and simultaneous decline of a focus on clients and customers); FCIC
REPORT, supra note 7, at XVIII–XIX (observing that the changes in business operation
“reflected a fundamental change in these institutions, particularly the large investment
banks and bank holding companies”).
61 One can already see the beginnings of another potential rise in unethical lending
given the widespread access to personal data of individuals. See AnnaMaria Andriotis,
Need Cash? Companies Are Considering Magazine Subscriptions and Phone Bills When
Making Loans, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/need-cashcompanies-are-considering-magazine-subscriptions-and-phone-bills-when-makingloans-11568280601 (discussing how lenders are beginning to use consumer data and
even grades to determine creditworthiness of potential borrowers with traditionally
low credit scores). The article notes that in 2018 alone, lenders loaned nearly $160
billion to borrowers with “limited or no credit histories.” Id. Critics suggest that these
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And to further add to the challenge, commentators have also long
recognized the obstacle of corporate bureaucracy to a successful
prosecution.62 As organizations grow and divvy responsibility among
distinct and autonomous divisions, each responsible for parts of the
whole, the individual’s role in any one corporate act shrinks.63 As one’s
role in any criminal act decreases, one’s potential awareness of the act’s
criminal nature and one’s fear of apprehension both shrink in turn,
further incentivizing misconduct or diminishing the deterrence
function.64
The financial collapse occurred in part because of the accumulation
of reckless behavior at different levels of our largest financial
institutions.65 The behavior of lenders and bankers challenged reigning
economic theories that competition between firms could and would
incentivize them to behave ethically.66 Similarly, the growing demand
for mortgages to securitize and distribute led banks to forgo their
traditional due diligence.67 Observers note a series of biases and
rationalizations that explain the decline of ethical behavior among large
financial institutions.68 One powerful factor is “motivated blindness,”
which allows an individual to “see what they want to see and easily miss
contradictory information when it’s in their interest to remain ignorant
. . . [which] applies dramatically with respect to unethical behavior.”69

“could make millions of borrowers appear safer than they are” and may not be valid
indicators of a borrower’s ability to repay a loan. Id. Notably, lenders targeted similarly
situated borrowers leading up to the financial collapse. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 7,
at 6–7 (discussing the rise of loans to individuals with no jobs, no assets, and/or no
income (termed a NINJA loan)).
62 Coffee, Jr., supra note 18, at 397.
63 Id. at 397–98.
64 Id. at 392.
65 See supra notes 2–3 (explaining the mortgage securitization process); see also
FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 90 (same). While the behavior of lenders in creating bad
loans began the cycle that would culminate in the financial collapse, securitization of
these mortgages greatly exacerbated the crisis by amplifying the market without the
requisite level of due diligence, resulting in the failure of major financial institutions and
collapse of the market. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at XXIV.
66 Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 57, at 635 (concluding that “[i]ncreased
scarcity and competition within markets pushed vertically integrated firms to commit
crime in order to keep their securities businesses going”).
67 FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 165 (“In theory, every participant along the
securitization pipeline should have had an interest in the quality of every underlying
mortgage. In practice, their interests were often not aligned.”). See generally id.
at 165–68 (discussing failures in completing appropriate due diligence).
68 Mayer et al., supra note 49, at 534–37 (observing “ethical blind spots” in business
decisions).
69 Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, supra note 53, at 61.

PATEL (DO NOT DELETE)

914

4/15/2021 11:56 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:901

In the lead up to 2008, there was a concerted push among banks to
create more mortgage-backed investments to meet “burgeoning global
demand for [them].”70 This push led firms to increase the origination of
risky, subprime mortgages and then misrepresent the risk of the
subsequent investments.71 The diminishing supply of mortgages and
the government’s encouragement of homeownership further
exacerbated these pressures.72 The vertical integration of the different
functions in the derivative pipeline, previously thought to align
interests, further pushed individual actors toward fraud and increased
the opportunity for concealment.73
A potential source for these developments includes the priorities
and incentives set by corporate management.74 During its inquiry, the
FCIC heard testimony from several executives at major lending
institutions and banks that all fit a consistent pattern: the executives,
mostly at middle levels, would raise concerns about the risky nature of
investments to no avail and have their concerns “brushed aside” by their
superiors to keep their organizations competitive.75 JPMorgan Chase
CEO Jamie Dimon’s testimony to the FCIC is instructive: “I blame the
management teams and . . . no one else.”76 Despite these internal reports
and external observations from regulators and academics “that the
housing market was slowing, Wall Street just kept going and going—
ordering up loans, packaging them into securities, taking profits,
earning bonuses.”77 When asked about his efforts to investigate reports
70

FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
Id. at 28 (observing that “this became a market in which the participants—
mortgage brokers, lenders, and Wall Street firms—had a greater stake in the quantity of
mortgages signed up and sold than in their quality”); see also Fligstein & Roehrkasse,
supra note 57, at 618 (observing that “a dwindling supply of legally contractible
mortgages created new resource constraints”).
72 See Rakoff, supra note 19 (discussing the government’s own involvement in the
mortgage crisis); Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, supra note 53, at 60 (same).
73 Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 57, at 635 (“Increased scarcity and
competition within markets pushed vertically integrated firms to commit crime to keep
their securities businesses going.”).
74 Id. at 636 (asking whether “fraud spread through leadership and imitation” as a
potential explanation for organizational behavior).
75 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 18–20 (observing that “[a]t too many financial
firms, management brushed aside the growing risks to their firms” and documenting
examples of executives raising concerns to upper management to no avail). One Lehman
Brothers executive who raised concerns explained that she was “shunted aside.” Id.
at 18–19. She left Lehman shortly thereafter. Id. at 19. A Citigroup executive continually
raised concerns to upper management but noted his attempts “never translated into any
action. Instead, . . . there was a considerable push to build volumes, to increase market
share.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 Id. at 18 (alterations in original).
77 Id.
71
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made by one of his employees, Citigroup Chairman of the Board of
Directors and former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin stated: “I do
recollect this and that either I or somebody else, and I truly do not
remember who, but either I or somebody else sent it to the appropriate
people, and I do know factually that that was acted on promptly and
actions were taken in response to it.”78 After raising those concerns, the
employee was demoted.79
The decision to keep going despite the signs to stop was made in
part because managers viewed their investment into mortgage markets
“purely [as] a business decision rather than an ethical one.”80
Essentially, management “[saw] what they want[ed] to see” in the
continued profits of and “easily miss[ed] contradictory information
[because it was] in their interest to remain ignorant.”81 The diffuse
nature of the institutions and levels of separation between the
originators and underwriters on the ground and upper management all
coalesced into a perfect storm when combined with the deregulated
industry.
But given what we know about this perfect storm, it seems easy to
argue that no one in upper management had the specific intent to
defraud anyone.
The upper executives certainly have some
responsibility for consciously ignoring or even encouraging illicit
behavior—one might even say they were reckless.82 But suppose for the
moment that at least some of these employees at these firms acted with
that specific intent and that a prosecutor could prove their intent, which
is typically not easily done.83 Punishing these employees likely means
little to upper management, given its myopic focus on profits and
competitiveness.84 Similarly, upper management’s veiled ignorance and
pressuring of employees means little to the prosecutor who needs to
prove specific intent to defraud but cannot do so.85 Punishing the entity

78

Id. at 19.
Id.
80 See Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, supra note 53, at 59.
81 Id. (describing motivated blindness).
82 See infra Part IV (advocating to apply a reckless standard to executives who
oversaw fraudulent activities).
83 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 2 (explaining the distinction between purpose,
or specific intent, and other, lower criminal intent standards).
84 See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 57, at 635 (“Our evidence is most
inconsistent with accounts emphasizing that firms care about their reputations enough
that they tend not to engage in fraud.”)
85 Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1996, 2014–18
(2006) (observing that fraud must be “open-textured” to keep up with novel forms of
artifice but concluding that fraud morally requires a finding of “conscious wrongdoing”).
79
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may bring the executives within the State’s reach, but brings collateral
consequences upon innocent parties.86
These examples illustrate the aforementioned challenges facing the
State as a corporate regulator. But the financial crisis is only the most
recent example of unethical corporate behavior gone awry, and it likely
will not be the last.87 Here, if we accept that fraud requires specific
intent, we must punish the lower-level actors because they fit the law’s
definition of culpability. But on the same token, we must also let upper
executives go free because they are not sufficiently culpable to fit the
law’s definition. Or we punish the entity and let management decide
who takes the fall. Culpability is masked by indirect actions that
promoted illicit behavior and by ignorance of the risks of such actions
or the actions themselves. This begs the question: given their ignorance
and the substantial risks of their policies, are the senior decision makers
in upper management not morally culpable for setting risky policies88
and ignoring the signs of impending calamity? If criminal law fails to
target the root of the problem, only treating the symptoms, is it
effective? This Comment suggests that perhaps it is not.
C. Present Remedies: Cold Porridge
The Great Recession may have been the worst financial disaster
since the Great Depression, but it was not the only financial disaster
since the Depression. This Section describes several other events that
drew responsive legislative attempts to refocus corporate criminal
liability on management, where it would be the most effective. These
responses are all steps along the trend toward individual accountability
but fall short of effectively achieving it.

86

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See Ben Eisen, Charles Scharf Puts Stamp on Wells Fargo With Overhaul of
Reporting Lines, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/charlesscharf-puts-stamp-on-wells-fargo-with-overhaul-of-reporting-lines-11581438600
(explaining how Wells Fargo, in the wake of its fake-account scandal, has changed its
operating structure).
88 Prosecutors can distinguish fraudulent conduct from “sharp, innovative economic
practices” is by comparing the conduct to market norms. Buell, supra note 85, at 2015.
When a market undergoes a shift like the lending market did, however, that distinction
becomes difficult to make. See id.; FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 28 (noting the “profound
changes in the mortgage industry”).
87
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act89 was a legislative response to the Enron
and WorldCom scandals.90 The Act’s primary focus is the internal
compliance structures of corporations, introducing reforms such as
requiring independent directors on corporate boards, measures to
ensure auditor independence, and stricter evaluation of conflicts of
interest.91 The Act also increased the sentences for various white-collar
criminal statutes, including mail and wire fraud, but made no
substantive changes to the law.92 Setting aside the sections targeting
internal compliance, the Act’s criminal provisions largely overlap with
existing criminal laws, enhancing penalties in some areas.93 Sentencing
enhancement means little if prosecutors cannot charge and convict the
right defendants.
The Dodd-Frank Act94 was the legislative response to the financial
crisis of 2008.95 Dodd-Frank contains two sections related to criminal
liability.96 Section 741 criminalizes fraud in particular types of
securities transactions; yet these actions already fall into the broad
range of conduct under the wire or mail fraud statute and change
nothing with respect to the level of intent prosecutors must
demonstrate for conviction.97 Section 747 lowers the mens rea for the
originating party in a swap transaction but still requires that the
counterparty have the intent to deceive, presenting almost as high of a
89 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
& 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
90 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 59–60 (describing the Enron and WorldCom
scandals).
91 See generally William S. Duffey, Jr., Corporate Fraud and Accountability: A Primer
on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 54 S.C. L. REV. 405 (2002) (describing the provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Internal compliance refers to an organization’s own systems
for policing and reporting on employees who break laws or internal regulations. See
Krawiec, supra note 57, at 494 (defining internal compliance structures).
92 See id. at 407–09.
93 See Luke A. E. Pazicky, A New Arrow in the Quiver of Federal Securities Fraud
Prosecutors: Section 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1348), 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 801, 802 (2003) (“[I]t seems like the Securities Fraud Statute will only nominally
impact federal securities fraud prosecutions.”).
94 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
95 See id. (“An Act [t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’,
to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices, and for other purposes.”).
96 See 124 Stat. at 1729–31, 1739 (Section 741 entitled Enforcement, and Section
747 entitled Antidisruptive Practices Authority).
97 See Jennifer Chawla, Criminal Accountability and Wall Street Executives: Why the
Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Fall Short, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 959
(2014).

PATEL (DO NOT DELETE)

918

4/15/2021 11:56 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:901

bar as the previous statutes that prosecutors relied on when alleging
fraud in complex financial transactions.98
The most recent trend in combating corporate corruption does not
involve new crimes or regulations. Rather, this trend involves the
prosecution of and eventual settlement with the corrupt organization
through Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) and NonProsecution Agreements (“NPAs”).99 The most recent development in
this trend is the Yates Memo, a communication from then-Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates titled: “Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing.”100 The Memo notes that seeking individual
accountability is “[o]ne of the most effective ways to combat corporate
misconduct” and that “it deters future illegal activity, it incentivizes
changes in corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are
held responsible for their actions, and it promotes the public’s
confidence in our justice system.”101
The Yates Memo then acknowledges the difficulties in pursuing
high-level corporate actors “who may be insulated from the day-to-day
activity in which the misconduct occurs,” noting that “responsibility can
be diffuse and decisions are made at various levels, [and] it can be
difficult to determine if someone possessed the knowledge and criminal
intent necessary” to convict.102 The Memo then provides guidelines to
“strengthen [the DOJ’s] pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing,”
advising federal prosecutors to require corporations to provide “all
relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct”
to qualify for cooperation credit, and to “focus on individuals from the
inception of the investigation.”103
Prosecutors sometimes
simultaneously rely on the corporation’s internal investigation to
conduct its own investigation.104 Relying on corporate internal
98

See id.
See generally Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 1303–17 (describing the rise of the DOJ’s
use of DPAs and NPAs). The DOJ’s use of these agreements has a tumultuous history as
different administrations have promulgated different guidelines for their use. See id.
100 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to
All U.S. Att’ys et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015),
at 1, https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates
Memo].
101 Id.
102 Id. at 2.
103 Id.
104 See Rakoff, supra note 19.
Early in the investigation, you invite in counsel to the company and
explain to him or her why you suspect fraud. He or she responds by
assuring you that the company wants to cooperate and do the right
thing, and to that end the company has hired a former assistant US
attorney, now a partner at a respected law firm, to do an internal
99
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investigations has both advantages and disadvantages.105 But this
Comment suggests that these practices are necessary rather than
sufficient for an effective regulatory apparatus. They can significantly
aid an effective prosecution of individual wrongdoing once started, but
they do little to help initiate prosecutions.
Though they emphasize the right place, both the DOJ and the
drafters of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts do not precisely
address the diffuse nature of responsibility that makes prosecution so
difficult. This challenge requires a different approach to combat
corporate misconduct, one that addresses the difficulties of pursuing the
right individuals in the diffuse corporate network but retains sufficient
moral justification to impose criminal sanction.

investigation. The company’s counsel asks you to defer your
investigation until the company’s own internal investigation is
completed, on the condition that the company will share its results
with you. In order to save time and resources, you agree.
Six months later the company’s counsel returns, with a detailed
report showing that mistakes were made but that the company is
now intent on correcting them. You and the company then agree that
the company will enter into a deferred prosecution agreement that
couples some immediate fines with the imposition of expensive but
internal prophylactic measures. For all practical purposes the case is
now over. You are happy because you believe that you have helped
prevent future crimes; the company is happy because it has avoided
a devastating indictment; and perhaps the happiest of all are the
executives, or former executives, who actually committed the
underlying misconduct, for they are left untouched.
Id.; see also Sharon Oded, Coughing up Executives or Rolling the Dice?: Individual
Accountability for Corporate Corruption, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 49, 75–78 (2016).
105 Compare Oded, supra note 104, at 75–80 (explaining the conflict of interest
created by the Yates Memo can cause tension between corporations and individual
employees and may actually chill corporate prosecution), with Danielle Young, No
Longer a Cost of Doing Business; The Yates Memo Signals DOJ is Serious About Going After
Individuals, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Sept. 28, 2015), https://globalanticorruption
blog.com/2-15/09/28/no-longer-a-cost-of-doing-business-the-yates-memo-signlasdoj-is-serious-about-going-after-individuals/ (discussing some advantages of the Yates
Memo’s reforms). Additionally, an internal investigation, like any other corporate
activity, is completed at the behest of management. Management can decide what
information the organization provides the government, where the funds to pay fines
come from, and who goes on the chopping block. Coffee Jr., supra note 18, at 401; see
also Peter J. Henning, Pursuit of Individuals in Corporate Misconduct Still Arduous, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/pursuit-ofindividuals-in-corporate-misconduct-still-arduous (“The emphasis on delivering
evidence to allow the prosecution of individual employees sounds like an effort to have
corporations throw them under the proverbial bus to secure lenient treatment.”).
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III. RCO LIABILITY AND THE TRAVAILS OF PORRIDGE THAT IS TOO HOT
The RCO doctrine allows a prosecutor to hold accountable the
leader of an organization that commits a crime, regardless of his or her
participation or knowledge of the criminal action, employing strict
liability.106 It is a powerful tool that allows prosecutors to target highlevel actors in business organizations in the face of diffuse
responsibility.107 Given this use, it would seem to be an answer to the
first problem identified above, as it specifically targets the highest
possible official who stands in “responsible relation” to the
misconduct.108 But its use of strict liability goes too far and fails to solve
the second problem, as it does not target management in a morally
justifiable way. This Part will first discuss the RCO and strict liability,
explaining why strict liability goes too far to combat corporate
misconduct. Finally, it will make similar arguments as to why a
negligence standard, employed by the CEAA, also goes too far.
A. RCO Liability: An Executive’s Worst Nightmare
The RCO doctrine “imposes not only a positive duty [on corporate
officers] to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also,
and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will ensure that
violations will not occur.”109 The doctrine essentially imposes this duty
106 In United States v. Dotterweich, Supreme Court created the doctrine in its
interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s (“FDCA”) use of the words “any
person” in a 5-4 decision. 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (concluding the FDCA “dispenses
with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard
upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger”). The FDCA imposes a fine or one year of imprisonment on “any person” who
conducts one the listed prohibited acts without specifying a mens rea component. Id.
at 280 (noting that the FDCA imposed strict liability). Section 331 prohibits “causing”
various actions, including the adulteration or misbranding of foods and drugs, and
Section 333 sets forth the appropriate punishments. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333. The Court
again upheld RCO liability in United States v. Park, a 6-3 decision, where the Court
resolved a circuit split on whether prosecutors needed to show that the defendant took
some “wrongful action” to convict. 421 U.S. 658, 666–67 (1975). Park involved a
misdemeanor conviction of a corporate officer who failed to remedy a rodent infestation
at a food warehouse despite having notice of the problem under the FDCA. Id. at 658–59.
The Court concluded that the FDCA imposed “not only a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement
measures that will insure that violations will not occur.” Id. at 659.
107 See Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of
Responsible Corporate Officer Liability, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371, 377–78 (2014);
Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1245 (2006).
108 As identified above, Senator Warren’s bill employs the RCO doctrine. See supra
Part I.
109 Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
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on officers where the duty would only have applied to the principal, the
corporate entity.110 One of its justifications is the long-held principle
that among the two innocent parties, the victim and the principal, the
latter should be held liable for the harmful acts of its agent rather than
the victim; however, RCO liability places the officer in the role of the
principal.111
The RCO doctrine allows prosecutors to bypass subordinates who
committed criminal acts to target managers in their oversight
capacity.112 Recall from above the executives who dismissed their
employees’ concerns about the housing bubble.113 Like both the
defendants in Park and Dotterweich, they had some awareness of and
perhaps even indirect participation in their subordinates’ criminal
acts.114 But some awareness and indirect participation are not enough
for a fraud charge.115 Willful or motivated blindness, or even implicit
encouragement, will not be enough to reach the high intent standards
required.116 But under RCO, a prosecutor need not prove willful
blindness to get to an officer, much less specific intent.117 Thus, the
charge brings to bear the regulatory effect of the criminal sanction,
deterring future misconduct in the party in the best position to
recidivate.118 This would seemingly solve the first problem identified
above of targeting corporate management.
But the RCO doctrine has been primarily applied to food, drug, and
environmental regulatory violations that carry criminal penalties,
largely conforming to the conception of “public welfare offenses.”119
The statutes punish a corporate officer of a misdemeanor on a strict
liability theory, elevating to a felony charge if the officer also had the
110 Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite”—A Critique
of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 301 (2012).
111 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (“In the interest of the larger good [RCO liability]
puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger.”); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS 500 (5th Ed. 1984) (discussing the proper placement of liability among
two actors).
112 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (describing how lenders and banks
churning out bad mortgages, lowering lending standards, and waiving requirements, all
to meet the growing demand for securitization).
115 See Buell, supra note 85 at 2014–18.
116 Id.
117 Dotterweich, 330 U.S. at 280 (noting that the FDCA imposed strict liability).
118 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1272–73 (describing how
corporate managers would behave if a statute criminalized reckless supervision).
119 See Amiad Kushner, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Outside
the Public Welfare Context, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 683 (2003).
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intent to defraud.120 To support imposing strict liability, the Supreme
Court observed that in the food and drug context, members of the public
“are largely beyond self-protection.”121 One might argue the consumers
affected by the Great Recession are similarly “largely beyond selfprotection,” and one might also argue that the hefty fines accompanying
DPAs and NPAs are “license fees.”122 Strict liability itself exists in part
“to ease the prosecution’s path to conviction,”123 which would seemingly
be a direct solution to the difficulty in prosecuting high-level corporate
officers. Yet, strict liability faces strident criticism.124 The Supreme
Court has recognized that strict liability prosecution under the RCO
doctrine “holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence.”125
B. Using RCO Liability to Combat Corporate Financial Fraud
Indeed, this overdeterrence problem should prove fatal to an
expansion of strict liability as a mainstay tool to fight corporate
misconduct. Corporate entities are statutory creatures that exist to
manage and distribute the risks and rewards associated with business
decisions.126 While excessive caution may prevent exposure to liability,
it also hinders business returns.127 Adopting strict liability on such a
large scale would thus be, to some degree, inconsistent with the purpose
of corporate institutions. It would require almost no connection
between the corporate officer and the criminal acts to impose criminal
liability.128 But it may be impossible to divorce senior decision makers
120

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 676.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280–81.
122 Id.; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1236 (offering as an
example that securities and antitrust “statutes seek to deter those who, for economic or
other reasons, might be tempted to act in a socially harmful manner”); Christina Schuck,
A New Use for the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Prosecuting Industry Insiders
for Mortgage Fraud, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 371, 389 (2010) (calling for an expansion
of RCO liability to mortgage fraud in response to the economic consequences of the 2008
financial crisis).
123 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
124 The two main critiques are that (1) strict liability does not effectively deter an
actor who did not know he was engaging in misconduct, and (2) that “it is unjust to
condemn a person who is not morally culpable.” DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 16,
at 195.
125 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978) (requiring a
mens rea for antitrust offenses and rejecting the use of an “effects alone” test).
126 See generally, BAUMAN, supra note 28, at 7–8.
127 Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441 (observing “salutary . . . conduct lying close to the
borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who chose to
be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to
criminal punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment.”).
128 See United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev’d
sub nom., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278 (“Dotterweich had no personal connection with
121
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from corporate acts, especially in an industry as interconnected and
complex as banking or finance. Additionally, while the securitization
process and subsequent derivative market heavily contributed to the
financial collapse, they also proved to be extremely lucrative and useful,
and continue to be profitable under closer scrutiny and new
regulations.129
But while strict liability certainly presents an overdeterrence
problem, it has a deeper issue with its moral underpinnings.130 Our
most basic intuition of fairness would preclude us from criminally
sanctioning or morally condemning someone who has not behaved
immorally.131 Adopting strict liability wholesale would turn this
intuition on its head by removing the question of whether the accused
is sufficiently culpable. Yet, this observation has at least one moving
target that confounds the issue: the precise definition of immoral.
Assume that the behavior of executives at mortgage originators, at
security underwriters, and at credit rating agencies, did not involve any
specific intent to defraud. This is not a remarkably difficult assumption
to make—many of the executives overseeing the mortgage
securitization pipeline sought for all parties involved to enjoy the profits
of the pipeline.132 But consider again the executives’ behavior in light of
that assumption—does their pursuit of profit nullify their ignorance of
the collateral risks of their conduct? Does their tendency to minimize
the ethical considerations (motivated blindness) or ignore them
completely qualify as immoral? Could one not label their behavior
negligent—or perhaps even reckless? Certainly, the answers to these
questions are sufficiently debatable for further inquiry.
While RCO liability is of judicial origin, expanding RCO liability to
general corporate misconduct requires the appropriate statutory
language—the CEAA is one potential application.133 It uses a mens rea
either shipment, but he was in general charge of the corporation’s business and had
given general instructions to its employees to fill orders received from physicians.”).
129 FCIC REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (“Securitization was one of the most brilliant
financial innovations of the 20th century . . . [i]t freed up a lot of capital. If it had been
done responsibly, it would have been a wondrous thing . . . .”).
130 Petrin, supra note 110, at 299 (“Contrary to a common approach to establishing
individual liability under both tort and criminal law, liability under the RCO doctrine
does not require any personal participation, commission, or authorization of any
wrongful conduct.”).
131 See DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 16, at 35 (explaining the retributivist theory of
criminal law).
132 FCIC REPORT, supra note 18, at 117 (describing bank profits from asset-backed
security deals).
133 S. 1010., supra note 26. The CEAA purports to use RCO liability as a broad-based
mechanism to combat corporate crime using a negligence standard. Its provisions fit

PATEL (DO NOT DELETE)

924

4/15/2021 11:56 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:901

standard of negligence, avoiding the difficulties of specific intent.134 But
commentators have also long criticized negligence as a basis for
criminal liability.135 Indeed, a negligence standard still exacerbates the
overdeterrence problem.136 The corporation and its agents must
necessarily take risks to accomplish their goals, allocating the
consequent benefits and costs of those risks.137 Consider the parallel
example of fiduciary duty litigation, where corporate directors owe the
shareholders a duty of care “predicated upon concepts of gross
negligence.”138 Criminal negligence is also, to some degree, predicated
upon concepts of gross negligence.139 But to equate the two standards
would be to equate—or even subordinate—criminal law to civil law, an
untenable proposition.140 The procedural hurdles in shareholder
litigation would further make a criminal prosecution easier to
accomplish than a derivative suit.141 In other words, prosecutors might
have an easier time criminally charging an executive than a shareholder
would in challenging a board action.142
A negligence standard also poses a practical problem due to its use
of the reasonable person standard. A reasonable person standard is
easy to conceptualize when applied to a tort action stemming from a car
accident. But such a standard is significantly more difficult to define in
the context of corporate corruption.143 “Whether negligence is morally
culpable is an interesting philosophical question,” but it is safe to say
that the lack of consensus belies any argument that we should employ a

squarely with the RCO doctrine’s public welfare and consumer protection theories. See
Off. of Senator Elizabeth Warren, supra note 26 (citing the FDCA as an example of
legislation fighting corporate misconduct).
134 S. 1010., supra note 26.
135 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 949 (2000); Robert P. Fine & Gary M. Cohen, Is Criminal
Negligence a Defensible Basis for Penal Liability, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 751–52 (1967).
136 Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1271.
137 BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 6–8.
138 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 (considering different definitions of criminal
negligence, including that of gross negligence).
140 See Coffee Jr., supra note 18, at 392–95.
141 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, §§ 7.41 (requiring standing for derivative suits),
7.42 (requiring shareholders make a demand on the corporation before proceeding with
a derivative suit).
142 Interestingly, this disparity seems to be the case in the context of Section 10(b)
enforcement. See Ann M. Olazábal & Patricia S. Abril, Recklessness as A State of Mind In
10(B) Cases: The Civil-Criminal Dialectic, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 305, 332 (2015)
(observing that developments in the civil and criminal enforcement of securities laws
have led to a mismatch in intent requirements).
143 Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1272.
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negligence standard as a mainstay tool to combat corporate
misconduct.144
So, we come now to a situation wherein there is a lower bound to
any potential remedy that is ineffective for failure to track modern
corporate behavior. There is an upper bound in pure RCO liability or
RCO liability with a negligence standard for the failure to limit sanction
to sufficiently culpable conduct. As the fairy tale goes, we now consider
the solution that is just right.
IV. CRIMINAL RECKLESSNESS: JUST RIGHT
Recklessness is a state of mind that involves a conscious disregard
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.145 Recklessness is used in a
variety of contexts in both criminal and tort law.146 This Part will discuss
the definition of recklessness and its doctrinal underpinnings,
concluding that when combined with RCO liability, it is an effective way
to combat corporate misconduct.
A. Criminal Recklessness: A Dialogue of Risk and Reward
Recklessness comes in both objective and subjective varieties.147
Objective recklessness, often invoked in civil liability, measures an
actor’s conduct against an objective standard.148
Subjective
recklessness requires finding that the specific actor consciously
disregarded the risk.149 Courts have considered both criminal
recklessness and its civil counterpart “nebulous” and incapable of
precise definition.150 One might conceptualize recklessness as a
culpable state of belief, a culpable state of desire,151 or a combination of
both.152 Recklessness sits just below purpose and knowledge on the
144

Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2015 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3); see also Alexander, supra note 135, at 933 & n.12
(discussing the uniformity of different jurisdictional definitions of recklessness). From
an etymological purpose, different conceptions of the word reckless range from mere
carelessness to wickedness. See Olazábal & Abril, supra note 142, at 311–12.
146 Olazábal & Abril, supra note 142, at 308.
147 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–38 (1994).
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 836 n.4; see also Olazábal & Abril, supra note 142, at 309–10.
151 See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 464–65
(1992). Professor Simons divides mens rea hierarchies into those involving culpable
belief-states, such as knowledge, and culpable desire-states, such as purpose. Id.
Recklessness sits on both sides, however, because it can involve a belief-state—that one
is consciously aware of his risk creation—and a desire-state, such as callousness. Id.
152 See Alexander, supra note 135. One might also argue that recklessness always
involves both a belief and desire-state, in that one must believe or be consciously aware
145
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hierarchy of mental states but employs different considerations than the
higher mental states.153 Arguably, one can reduce both purpose and
knowledge to binary considerations.154 An actor either has a morally
condemnable purpose or does not have one; he either knows his act is
morally condemnable or does not know.155
In contrast, recklessness is not a binary framework as purpose and
knowledge both are. It exists as a continuum of mental states all based
on the relative weights of two factors—the substantiality and
unjustifiability of the risk associated with the act.156 With a recklessness
standard, a jury can rely on circumstantial evidence to infer the
defendant’s conscious understanding or knowledge of the various
factors that contribute to the substantiality of the risk and the factors
that make up the defendant’s justification for the risk.157 Thus, suppose
a jury had overwhelming evidence that any person, reasonable or
unreasonable, who saw the same evidence the defendant saw would
know that a risk was substantial. It can infer from this situation that the
defendant knew the risk was substantial and then evaluate the
defendant’s offered justification.
B. The New(ish) Solution: Criminalizing Risky Business
The preceding sections explain that the RCO doctrine provides a
mechanism to connect a corporate officer to the criminal conduct of
their subordinates, putting the officer in the place of the principal rather
than the organization. In a sense, this becomes the actus reus of the
offense.158 Each senior decision maker discussed in Part II exercised

of a risk and that one must have some desired justification for the risk. See Joshua
Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All: Thoughts on Alexander’s Unified Conception of
Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 955, 957 (2000).
153 See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02.
154 From a practical perspective, all evidence of mental state is likely to be shown
through circumstantial evidence that allows the factfinder to draw an inference that the
defendant had the requisite mental state. In so finding, however, the jury is asked to
make a binary choice, whether or not the actor had a criminal purpose or knowledge.
155 See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02 cmt. 2.
156 Alexander, supra note 135, at 933.
Recklessness standards range from
“awareness that one is doing something wrongful,” to a specific intent to defraud
standard, to a mere negligence standard. Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud? 61
Duke L.J. 511, 556–57 (2011) (explaining the range of criminal intent requirements used
by lower courts for criminal securities violations and collecting cases).
157 Olazábal & Abril, supra note 142, at 315–16.
158 Consider again an RCO strict liability crime. Without an intent requirement, all a
corporate officer must “do” is be a corporate officer who has some oversight function
over the offending conduct, proceeding on an omission-like theory. See Sepinwall, supra
note 107, at 378 (“[T]he doctrine permits the prosecution and punishment of corporate

PATEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/15/2021 11:56 AM

COMMENT

927

some oversight over individuals at some point in the mortgage
securitization pipeline; at a minimum, they received reports from these
employees.159 Accordingly, they would fall within the doctrine’s reach
as they each have “a responsible share in the furtherance of the
[conduct] which the statute outlaws” even if they lack “consciousness of
[their] wrongdoing.”160 But the fundamental problem RCO liability
raises is that “even if some executives who did not participate in the
corporate crime deserve to be punished, many others do not, and
nothing in the RCO doctrine itself provides a principled basis upon
which to distinguish between the two sets of executives.”161
Recklessness is that principled basis. When combined with
criminal intent, prosecutors can use RCO beyond its public welfare
justification.162 A recklessness standard is a balanced approach to
individual accountability in corporate misconduct by ensuring sufficient
culpability without the near-impossible bar of specific intent to combine
with the RCO’s focus on oversight. A recklessness standard serves the
goals of retribution by first applying a minimum level of culpability,
thereby avoiding the overdeterrence problem presented by a lower
standard.163
Recklessness also goes beyond mere negligence: it requires a
conscious risk creation, an active effort to ignore the substantially
harmful consequences of one’s conduct that is accepted as morally
culpable.164 Recklessness’s moral culpability draws from an actor’s
executives who have not participated in their corporation’s crime, even if they had no
knowledge of the crime at the time of its occurrence.”).
159 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
160 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943).
161 Sepinwall, supra note 107, at 379; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
605–06 (1994) (observing that “the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly
embedded,” and requiring “some indication of congressional intent, express or implied,
. . . to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime”). The Model Penal Code (“MPC”)
also presumes a mens rea of at least recklessness when a statute is silent as to a
culpability requirement. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 5.
162 Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1275. In simpler terms, this approach
would create the crime of “reckless supervision.” See id. at 1270. As Developments in the
Law does, one might propose actual criteria for an actus reus of reckless supervision, but
such a proposal is likely substantially similar to what the RCO doctrine already does.
Compare United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (imposing “not only a positive
duty to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty
to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur”), with
Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1271 (“Knowledge of a potentially criminal
condition or course of conduct triggers a supervisor’s duty to act nonrecklessly to avert
the crime.”).
163 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1270.
164 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2015 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“There can
be no real dispute that recklessness regarding a risk of serious harm is wrongful
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awareness of the risk created by his conduct, requiring a finding that the
actor knew of the risk.165 The only difference with criminal negligence
is that the negligent actor is unaware of the risks associated with his
conduct but should have been aware, as a reasonable person would have
been aware.166 This awareness is crucial, as the offered justifications to
support criminal law fail without it.167
This awareness also helps elucidate the question of immorality
surrounding corporate behavior. Given its flexible interpretation,
recklessness would track the behavior of corporate executives during
the financial collapse. The line at which a corporate officer’s conduct
becomes sufficiently culpable should be at the point when the officer
knows of a substantial and unjustifiable risk but does nothing to prevent
or mitigate the consequences of that risk.
Consider an executive at an investment bank who oversees assetbacked securities and has been pushing her subordinates to market
more derivatives by setting near-unattainable profit goals. For many
subordinates, the only way to meet these extreme goals is to resort to
unethical behavior.168 For some, this unethical behavior rises to the
level of crime. Suppose that an employee in the compliance department
sends the executive an email raising concerns about the strength of the
loans underlying the security, suggesting that the derivatives that the
executive continued to demand could calamitously fail. The email raises
concern that the firm misrepresented a deal to its investors or even
defrauded them because of improper diligence. The potential failure of
the deal would result in massive losses for major institutional-investor

conduct. In a wide variety of contexts, we have described reckless conduct as morally
culpable.”). Elonis involved the interpretation of an interstate threat statute without a
mens rea requirement, and Justice Alito argued in favor of interpreting in a recklessness
standard as it accomplished the goal of “separat[ing] wrongful conduct from otherwise
innocent conduct.” Id. at 2015 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269
(2000)).
165 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3.
166 Id. § 2.02 cmt. 4. The drafters of the MPC justify criminal negligence by arguing
the deterrent value exists in motivating a greater standard of care in one’s actions and
the “moral defect” associated with an “insensitivity to the interests of other people.” Id.
Lastly, the drafters propose that any distinction necessary can be made at the sentencing
stage. Id.
167 Fine & Cohen, supra note 135, at 751. The deterrence and rehabilitation functions
fail because the actor cannot be deterred or rehabilitated from taking a risk of which he
is unaware; the retributive function fails because the actor has not committed an act that
is sufficiently morally culpable to impose moral condemnation; the incapacitation
function fails because incapacitation is only justified where less invasive measures
cannot equally protect society from the actor and here, education serves that protective
function. Id.
168 See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text (discussing motivated blindness).
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clients who manage the pension funds of hundreds of employees.
Further suppose the executive ignores this email. She continues to
demand mortgages for distribution. Could we not consider her
ignorance to be reckless in the criminal sense? At a certain point,
ignoring the concerns of calamity raised by her subordinates is ignoring
a substantial risk. Would we not consider her behavior to be sufficiently
culpable? She did not intend to defraud her clients. But she became
aware of the substantial risk created by her policies; she ignored it, and,
as a result, people suffered. This development was unfortunately
common in the lead up to the Great Recession.169
Consider another situation in which evidence that a firm engaged
in fraudulent activity is clearly sufficient to support a prosecution. The
firm’s acts resulted in innocent parties incurring substantial losses. The
firm has a history of engaging in these activities and routinely returns
to them even after the government responds. Given the diffuse nature
of corporate organizations, there is not enough evidence to sufficiently
connect any one executive to the firm’s actions, but it is well-understood
that someone high up is pushing the firm to engage in the misconduct.
Using RCO liability, the government can reach that person, preempting
the diffusion of responsibility. Under the old regime, the executive was
well-protected by these evidentiary hurdles. But under the new one, the
executive is vulnerable because they have an affirmative duty to prevent
misconduct. A failure to do so invites the possibility of criminal
prosecution on an omission-based theory. Even without a prosecution,
this vulnerability can incentivize ethical behavior.
Similarly, a recklessness standard also suffers less from the
evidentiary challenges of specific intent requirements.170 A prosecutor
need only prove that a corporate officer knew of the substantial risk of
harm, meaning an officer cannot escape criminal liability through
acquiescence or implicit authorization.171 No longer would an
executive’s statement that he was relying on the statements of others be
so disabling to a subsequent prosecution when it is discovered that his
department engaged in fraudulent activity. While there remains a
disincentive to obtain knowledge that might invite liability, this
influence is narrowed by recklessness’s focus on knowledge of risk
rather than specific knowledge.172 If anything, this disincentive may be
outweighed by an incentive to better understand the risks taken by the
organization to avoid criminal liability.
169
170
171
172

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1268–70.
See id. at 1272–73.
See id. at 1274.
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Operationally, the recklessness standard, as a continuum, plays a
different role in this context than it would in most other criminal
contexts. Arguably, the justification for corporate corruption can always
be reduced to profit, personal or organizational.173 Corporate crime is
defined as criminal acts that achieve organizational goals, and
corporations are profit-seeking organizations.174
Thus, when
considering whether an individual decision maker in a corporation was
reckless, the justification is likely the same for all actors. The individual
justifies his actions on the basis that his job was to make a profit. This
narrows a jury’s duty to determine only the substantiality of the risk and
whether the defendant knew of the substantiality of the risk known by
the defendant officer.
Prosecutors must still ask the question of whether that executive
recognized the substantiality of the risk his department took. This
determination, in turn, may guide the government in choosing which
executive to pursue using its newfound reach by way of the RCO
doctrine. Some executives will escape liability here as they were still
not sufficiently informed to warrant sanction, and the prosecution ends
there. Recklessness is still not an easy standard to prove to a jury. But
executives who were aware of a substantial risk, whether through
internal reports or communications, would still have to answer for their
actions in a criminal proceeding.175 This evidence can give rise to the
inference of recklessness.
The threat of criminal sanction and incarceration would
undoubtedly require management to ask more questions and
investigate irregularities further.176 The threat also signals a new focus
on effective corporate compliance and ethics to supply adequate
reporting mechanisms to seek out and prevent misconduct, or remedy

173

See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”);
State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc. 191 N.W. 2d 406 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting
shareholder’s “social and political” concerns as a basis to change corporate policy and
requiring that shareholders’ concerns in policy changes be economic); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (requiring corporate
directors, in certain situations, to solely consider profit maximization). These cases are
drawn from corporate law rather than criminal law; however, they illustrate the judicial
perspective on corporate purpose.
174 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
175 See Buell, supra note 156, at 557 (demonstrating all of the different ways courts
have upheld a finding of recklessness); Olazábal & Abril, supra note 142, at 315–16.
176 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1273 (“For instance, if a vice
president of sales knew that his sales managers met regularly with competitors, he
would be reckless not to inquire into the possibility that they were fixing prices.”).
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misconduct that has already occurred.177 A potential ancillary measure
can define rebuttable presumptions of non-recklessness for effective
internal controls, further incentivizing the controls against corporate
misconduct.178 The Supreme Court has recognized a potential defense
to RCO liability, an impossibility defense that precludes liability where
“it would have been objectively impossible for [the officer] to prevent
the underlying violations.”179
Lastly, developing this new liability scheme as a catch-all tool for
corporate corruption signals an adaption in the corporate regulatory
regime that reflects modern conceptions of corporate decision making.
Reshaping criminal law to combat the most egregious situations, such
as the lack of prosecutions of the individuals responsible for the
financial collapse, might serve as a first step to reforming the corporate
regulatory regime and invite further reform to civil sanctions and
private remedies to maintain a balance between different responses to
corporate corruption.180 And adapting these civil and administrative
remedies will reduce the need to rely on the heavy hand of criminal
sanction.181 The likely reality is that most
The combination of these doctrines creates an anti-corporate
misconduct tool that addresses the key doctrinal challenges posed by
corporate criminal liability. It is flexible, can be shown by inference, and
captures wrongful conduct with a relative but accepted measure of
moral culpability. It serves the goal of deterrence by targeting those
with the authority and in the best position to create reforms that
address organizational issues that result in corporate misconduct.
V. CONCLUSION
As the forgoing sections have argued, prosecutors need a new
catch-all tool to combat modern corporate corruption. Due to
decentralized structure, the diffusion of responsibility, and the
complexity of the modern corporation, prosecutors may have begun to
see the demise of the primacy of the fraud statutes as a tool against
corporate corruption, save securities fraud and its quasi-recklessness
177

See id. at 1274–75.
See id.
179 Sepinwall, supra note 107, at 387 (citing United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,
671–73 (1975)).
180 Olazábal & Abril, supra note 142, at 332–33 (calling for a reconciliation of intent
standards in securities law enforcement to improve the regulatory regime’s
effectiveness).
181 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 33, at 35–36 (discussing how effective action
at lower levels on the enforcement pyramid leads to less reliance on action at higher
levels).
178
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willfulness standard.
By combining the doctrines of criminal
recklessness and RCO liability, the government can coopt the flexible
nature of reckless conduct and the affirmative duty that RCO liability
creates. Combined with criminal sanction and all its stigmas and
deterrent value, the government can fashion a scheme of criminal
enforcement that specifically charges corporate management with the
duty to prevent violations. But the scheme only punishes those who
consciously disregard this duty and are therefore worthy of the moral
condemnation that accompanies criminal punishment. “It seems . . . that
if there were any logic to our language, trust would be a four-letter
word.”182 Does a new criminal standard signal the return of trust
between the public and corporate America? Probably not right away,
but it’s a start.

182

RISKY BUSINESS (Warner Bros. 1983).

